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De acuerdo con el denominado punto de vista teleológico de la creencia, la idea de 
que las creencias tienen como objetivo la verdad se considera que significa literalmente 
que el sujeto, al creer que p, tiene un cierto objetivo: el objetivo de aceptar p sólo si p es 
verdadera. Por el contrario, de acuerdo con el denominado punto de vista normativo, la 
afirmación de que las creencias tienen como objetivo la verdad se considera que es equi-
valente a la tesis de que existe una norma constitutiva de corrección que gobierna la 
creencia. El normativista argumenta que el punto de vista teleológico no puede dar cuenta 
a la vez de dos rasgos estándar de la creencia: por una parte, las creencias están a menudo 
causalmente influenciadas por consideraciones no aléticas; por otra, nosotros sentimos 
que es exclusivamente la verdad la que nos guía cuando deliberamos sobre si creer algo. 
En este artículo muestro, en primer lugar, que el argumento normativista no logra estable-
cer conclusivamente que la creencia está gobernada por una norma constitutiva de correc-
ción. En segundo lugar, y de manera más positiva, ofrezco una respuesta teleológica a 
cada una de las objeciones normativistas. Con ello, bosquejo una nueva estrategia teleo-
lógica que nos permite explicar los rasgos de la creencia antes mencionados. 
 




According to the so-called teleological view of belief, the idea that beliefs aim 
at truth is taken to mean literally that the subject, in believing that p, has a certain 
goal: the goal of accepting p only if p is true. In contrast, according to the so-called 
normative view, the claim that beliefs aim at truth is considered to be tantamount to 
the thesis that there is a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief. The norma-
tivist argues that the teleological view cannot jointly account for two standard features 
of belief: beliefs are often causally influenced by non-alethic considerations, yet we 
always feel we are moved exclusively by truth when deliberating whether to believe. 
In this paper, I first show that the normativist argument falls short of establishing that 
belief is norm-governed. Second, and more positively, I offer a teleological reply to 
each of the normativist objections, thereby outlining a novel teleological strategy that 
allows us to explain the aforesaid standard features of belief. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Belief has recently attracted the attention of philosophers working on the 
nature of normativity, for beliefs are naturally correct or incorrect, true or false. 
Beliefs are also constitutively and distinctively regulated for truth — either 
through non-conscious mechanisms or through doxastic deliberation, i.e., 
through the process by which, upon reflection on the available evidence, one 
comes to make a judgment about whether to believe that a particular proposi-
tion is true. The distinctive way in which truth regulates belief, i.e., the way 
in which beliefs are formed, maintained and discarded, makes belief different 
from other types of propositional attitudes, such as assumptions or guesses, in 
which truth nevertheless also plays an essential role. Williams’ (1973) classic 
saying ‘beliefs aim at truth’ seeks to connect such a distinctive role of truth to 
the very nature of belief. In an attempt to pin down the exact nature of the 
truth-regulation that Williams’ emblematic phrase suggests, the following 
two views of belief have recently been put forward. 
According to the teleological view, the idea that beliefs aim at truth is 
taken to mean literally that the subject, in believing that p, has a certain aim, 
the aim of regarding p as true only if p is true.1 The standard of correctness 
for belief is an aim: truth [see e.g., Velleman (2000); Steglich-Petersen 
(2006)]. By contrast, according to the normative view of belief [see e.g., 
Shah (2003); Shah and Velleman (2005)], to claim that beliefs aim at truth is 
considered to be tantamount to making it a rational requirement that the stan-
dard of correctness for belief is a norm: ‘believe that p only if p is true’ (the 
truth-norm henceforth).2 On the normative view, when a subject believes that 
p, the subject abides by the truth-norm, i.e., the subject implicitly accepts a 
normative judgment whose content is to believe that p only if p is true.  
The normativist argues that whereas, on their view, all central uncon-
troversial features of belief and belief formation can be explained at a single 
stroke, there are two such features that the teleologist cannot jointly explain. 
The first is that some beliefs are regulated, i.e., formed, maintained and dis-
carded, irrespective of truth-supporting considerations — typically those that 
we gather under the label of ‘wishful thinking’. The second feature that re-
sists explanation in teleological terms is, according to the normativist, not a 
property of belief itself, but a property of doxastic deliberation: transparency. 
Transparency, to be precise, is a property of doxastic deliberation as such de-
liberation is experienced from the first-personal point of view. It is the prop-
erty by which, in deliberating whether to believe that p, one cannot take 
oneself to be moved by anything but considerations relevant to the truth of p. 
In what follows, I will first flesh out both the teleological and the nor-
mative views on belief (Section II). After a brief caveat (Section III), I recon-
struct the normativist master argument against the teleological view, thereby 
emphasizing the role that transparency plays in the argument (Section IV). 
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The paper has two main aims. First (Section V), I attempt to show that the 
normativist thesis is, after all, explanatorily idle vis-à-vis transparency and 
hence that the normativist has given us no reason to hold that the standard of 
correctness for belief is the truth-norm. The second, more positive aim of the 
paper (Section VI), is to argue that a teleological view of belief can and does al-
low us to jointly account for the uncontroversial features of belief and belief 
formation highlighted by the normativist. Both claims have been defended be-
fore.3 The arguments I put forward, however, build upon some underdevel-
oped criticisms against the normative view (Section V), and allow me to then 
unveil a novel teleological strategy for dealing with the normativist objec-
tions (Section VI).  
 
 
II BELIEF: TWO COMPETING VIEWS 
 
The ordinary notion of belief encompasses different kinds of states, 
which are, in turn, formed through different kinds of processes. Two of these 
kinds are particularly relevant to the present discussion. On the one hand, 
‘belief’ is correctly used to refer to non-conscious mental states that seem to 
involve little more than an encoding of information as a guide to action; such 
states are formed automatically —no conscious activity or inquiry is in-
volved. On the other hand, ‘belief’ also refers to conscious, often linguisti-
cally articulated mental states that are the result of conscious deliberation.4 
However distinct, beliefs share a number of important uncontroversial 
features. One such feature is that they are truth-responsive, i.e., that whether 
automatically or as the result of deliberation, beliefs aim at representing the 
world as being a certain way and such representation is responsive to what-
ever evidence there is available to determine what is or is not the case. At the 
same time, it is all too apparent that non truth-conducive, non-alethic consid-
erations often causally influence belief — both automatically formed beliefs 
and beliefs formed through doxastic deliberation. Moreover, despite this 
causal influence of non-alethic considerations in our processes of belief for-
mation, we cannot knowingly and deliberately let non-alethic considerations 
settle the question whether to believe a particular proposition when we form a 
belief through doxastic deliberation. This feature, dubbed ‘transparency’ 
[Shah, (2003)], is described as follows by Shah &Velleman (2005), p. 447: 
 
The feature that we call transparency is this: The deliberative question whether 
to believe that p inevitably gives way to the factual question whether p, because 
the answer to the latter question will determine the answer to the former. That 
is, the only way to answer the question whether to believe that p is to answer 
the question whether p.5 
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This notion of transparency thus differs from Richard Moran’s (2001) homo-
nym occurring in discussions of self-knowledge. The relevant question in 
doxastic deliberation is not how I know that I believe that p, but how I decide 
whether to believe that p. As in the self-knowledge context, however, the 
transition from the question whether to believe that p to the question whether 
p is taken to be immediate and non-inferential, i.e., not mediated by any psy-
chological or instrumental factor. The idea of transparency aims to capture 
precisely the absence of any inferential steps between our answer to the de-
liberative question whether to believe that p and our answer to the question 
whether p. Of course, we sometimes think that we are moved only by truth-
conducive considerations when we are not. As I pointed out earlier, this caus-
al influence of non-alethic considerations takes place both when forming be-
liefs automatically and when forming beliefs through doxastic deliberation. 
Yet, even though all sorts of psychological mechanisms may prevent us from 
attending to and recognizing what is true, if belief is transparent, then we 
cannot form the belief that p while knowing that p is false. If we were to do 
so, the resulting attitude could not be considered a belief.  
Transparency, as stated in the Introduction, is not a property of belief or 
even a property of doxastic deliberation, if considered from a third person 
perspective. It is instead taken to be a necessary property of doxastic delib-
eration as the phenomenon is experienced from the first-personal point of 
view [Shah (2003)]. Transparency, as a property of what we take ourselves to 
be doing while deliberating about whether to believe that p, is included 
among the uncontroversial features to be accounted for by any adequate ac-
count of belief, together with the idea that, while in believing we aim at rep-
resenting just what is true, the causal influence of non-alethic considerations 
can make us fail to do so. 
Now, on the teleological view of belief, this idea of a state whose func-
tion or aim is to represent the world truly is taken to be constitutive of belief. 
It is constitutive of belief because that the state has such an aim tells us some-
thing about the very nature of belief — something that distinguishes it from 
other propositional attitudes [Velleman (2000), p. 247]. Given a state M with 
content p, it is constitutive of M’s being a belief that M is of a kind that is 
regulated in such a way so as to be directed towards attaining the truth 
[Velleman (2000); Steglich-Petersen (2006)]. The teleologist is thus commit-
ted to TEL: 
 
TEL: For any S, p: S believes that p if and only if S accepts p with the 
aim of accepting p only if p is true. 
 
It is a consequence of TEL that, when a subject forms a false belief, she has 
failed to do what she was trying to do, i.e., to reach the specific goal of that 
belief’s truth. The teleologist also makes it very clear that this regulation by 
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the aim of truth takes place both intentionally and automatically. At the inten-
tional level, when S believes that p, S intends to accept p, only if p is true, 
and S’s acceptance of p is regulated by this intention. In the case of automatic 
beliefs, the regulation comes from some cognitive mechanism of S’s. This 
mechanism has been designed, the teleologist claims, by evolution or appro-
priate training, to produce states consumed by S in such a way that S accepts 
p, only if p is true.6 
Velleman, once the main advocate of the teleological view [Velleman, 
(2000)], has since then joined forces with the competing, normative, view. 
On the version of the normative view that will concern us here [Shah (2003); 
Shah &Velleman (2005)], what it means for a subject S to believe that p is 
characterized as follows: 
 
NOR: For any S, p: S believes that p if and only if S accepts the truth-
norm [p is correct only if p is true]. 
 
NOR is, like TEL, a constitutive claim about belief, but, in NOR, ‘correct’ 
has a prescriptive reading.7 The truth-norm says that S ought to believe that p 
only if p is true. The prescriptive nature of the truth-norm does not result, the 
normativist contends, from belief having a constitutive aim. False beliefs are 
normatively flawed, but not because the agent has failed to reach the aim of ac-
cepting only what is true. On the normative view, when a subject forms a false 
belief, she fails to do what she ought to do, namely, to believe only what is true. 
The normativist thus argues that belief is not only constitutively governed by 
truth. It is, in addition, normatively regulated for truth, so that, in believing, we 
are subject to the truth-norm [Shah (2003); Shah and Velleman (2005)]. 
Interestingly, however, the defence of NOR is combined, on Shah and 
Velleman’s view, with a teleological account of how truth regulates belief in 
the case of beliefs formed through processes other than doxastic deliberation, 
and hence formed through processes that do not involve deployment of the 
concept of belief. It is the immediate and non-inferential nature of the transi-
tion from the question whether to believe that p to the question whether p, in 
which doxastic deliberation consists that (the normativist contends) is the ul-
timate challenge for the teleologist. The reasons will become clear in Section 
IV, where I examine the normativist master argument, but before then, I 
would like to express a caveat about a certain class of arguments against the 
normative view of belief. 
 
 
III. CAVEAT: THE EXACT FORMULATION OF THE NORM 
 
There is a set of objections against normativism, in general, and against 
the normative view of belief, in particular, that appeal to the inadmissible 
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logical consequences of particular formulations of the truth-norm — inad-
missible in the sense of not being able to capture the appropriate intended 
doxastic obligations. The arguments here are many [see e.g. Broome (1999); 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007); Glüer (1999); Glüer and Wikforss (2009); 
Hattiangadi (2006), (2007); Wikforss (2001)] and focus both on the version 
of the truth-norm that occurs in NOR and also on the stronger, biconditional, 
version of it, namely, the idea that a belief that p is correct if and only if p is 
true. If we take this stronger, biconditional form and explicitly formulate the 
truth-norm in prescriptive terms, we can write: 
 
PRE: S ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. 
 
Roughly, the idea behind these arguments is that no matter whether ‘ought’ 
in PRE takes a narrow or a wide scope, PRE does not capture the right doxa-
stic obligations. Hattiangadi and Bykvist (2007) are particularly clear on this 
issue and argue, quite convincingly, that if the ‘ought’ took a narrow scope, 
PRE would become 
 
(PRE a) For any S, p: if p is true, then S ought to (believe that p). 
 
(PRE b) For any S, p: if S ought to (believe that p), then p is true. 
 
But (PRE a) is clearly false. There is no obligation to believe all truths, espe-
cially the most insignificant and trivial ones. (PRE b), they argue, also fails to 
reflect the required regulation that truth exerts over belief formation, since if 
p were false, the norm would only tell us that it is not the case that we ought 
to believe it. The norm would not tell us that we ought not to believe it. Simi-
lar problems arise when the ‘ought’ in PRE takes wide scope as in (PRE c) 
below, since detachment is again not permitted and the doxastic obligation to 
believe what is true and to avoid believing what is false becomes diluted in 
the conditional form. 
 
(PRE c) For any S, p: S ought to (believe that p if and only if p is true).  
 
I am going over these very significant arguments against the normative view 
of belief with such haste, not because I do not deem them important, but 
because I believe there are more general considerations — considerations that 
do not depend on the exact formulation of the truth-norm — that help show 
that the normativist has given us no reason to hold that the standard of 
correctness for belief is a norm. I will try to articulate such considerations in 
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IV. THE NORMATIVIST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 
 
Remember that the teleologist’s main thesis is that belief is truth-
regulated acceptance. S’s acceptance of p is truth-regulated if and only if it is 
regulated either by S’s intention to accept p only if p is true or by a truth-
tracking cognitive mechanism that tracks only what is true. What is the na-
ture of this truth-regulation? — the normativist inquires. The answer comes 
in the form of a dilemma: the so-called teleologian’s dilemma [Shah (2003), 
pp. 460-465]. On the one horn of the dilemma, if truth-regulation were weak 
enough to allow us to count as beliefs cognitive states influenced by non-
alethic considerations, then, the normativist claims, we would not be able to 
explain transparency, as doxastic deliberation is regulated exclusively for 
truth, i.e., in doxastic deliberation we always take ourselves to be moved ex-
clusively by alethic considerations. On the other horn, were the notion of 
truth-regulation strong enough to explain transparency, many cognitive states 
that are typically considered beliefs would be unjustifiably disqualified as 
such. For many beliefs, e.g. those in which wishful thinking is in operation, 
are, as a matter of fact, causally influenced by non-alethic considerations and 
hence not exclusively regulated for truth.  
Interestingly, though, and twisting the horns slightly, even strong truth-
regulation is not appropriate for explaining transparency, for the role of truth 
on the teleological view is, the normativist claims, instrumental in the transi-
tion from the question whether to believe that p to the question whether p 
(more about this in Section VI). The solution to the teleologian’s dilemma, 
the normativist argues, is to make the truth-norm, namely, ‘believe that p 
only if p is true’, a conceptual truth about belief. It is thus crucial for the 
normativist to conceive the concept of belief as including a standard of cor-
rectness — the standard of being correct if and only if it is true.8 Since what 
we are trying to do in doxastic deliberation is precisely to settle the question 
whether to believe that p, and, in doing so, we deploy the concept of belief, 
we already commit ourselves to considering the attitude we thus form as sub-
ject to the truth-norm. By making the truth-norm a constitutive part of the 
concept of belief, the normativist claims to capture, on the one hand, the lack 
of any inferential or instrumental steps in the transition from the question 
whether to believe that p to the question whether p, and thus to explain the 
transparency of doxastic deliberation. On the other hand, such an account al-
lows us, the normativist claims, to regard instances of defective beliefs 
formed through doxastic deliberation as beliefs, for although we do not abide 
by the truth-norm in thus being causally influenced by non-alethic considera-
tions, we ought to do so. Finally, on the hybrid normative proposal endorsed 
by Shah and Velleman, automatically formed beliefs — beliefs formed with-
out deployment of the concept of belief — are weakly regulated for truth and 
will thus count as instances of belief whether they are defective or not.  
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Here is, in a nutshell, the normativist master argument: 
 
1. All cases of doxastic deliberation necessarily exhibit transparency. 
 
2. (1) needs to be explained. 
 
3. Weak truth-regulation is not enough to explain (1). 
 
4. Strong truth-regulation entails that defective beliefs cannot be con-
sidered beliefs. 
 
5. Strong truth-regulation is not appropriate to explain (1). 
 
6. Assumption: the truth-norm norm is constitutive of the concept of belief. 
 
7. All cases of doxastic deliberation are cases in which the subject (S) 
deploys the concept of belief.  
 
8. (6-7) explain (1) 
 
C: The truth-norm is a constitutive part of the concept of belief. 
 
In the rest of the paper, I first argue that, even if we took (1-7) to be 
true, (8) is false and hence the normativist has given us no reason to endorse 
the truth of (C). Assuming that the truth-norm is constitutive of the concept 
of belief does not have a genuine explanatory role vis-à-vis (1). Secondly, I 
challenge the truth of premises (3), (4) and (5) and thus show that the 
teleologist has the required theoretical resources to explain (1). 
 
 
V. THE EXPLANATORY IDLENESS OF NORMS 
 
For the normativist master argument to work, the assumption that the 
truth-norm is constitutive of the concept of belief must explain (1), i.e., it 
must explain that deployment of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation 
entails a particular kind of phenomenology: the experience of being subject 
solely to the truth-norm. The assumption has to explain the apparent fact that 
that we cannot knowingly and deliberately, i.e., without self-deception and 
the like, form a belief in a proposition while taking the available evidence to 
count against it; Yet, as has often been pointed out [see e.g. McHugh (2011); 
Steglich-Petersen (2006)], we are capable of engaging in activities governed 
by constitutive norms while knowingly and deliberately failing to abide by 
such norms. Consider, for instance, the view that assertion is constitutively 
governed by the truth-norm, both in the sense of claiming that it is a concep-
tual truth about assertion that an assertion is correct if and only if it is true, 
and in the prescriptive sense of claiming that one ought to assert p only if p is 
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true. This view does not entail that we cannot knowingly and deliberately as-
sert something false. A false assertion still counts very much as an assertion. 
The main difference between belief and assertion seems to be that while 
we can knowingly and deliberately assert something false and remain ra-
tional, it would be irrational for us to believe that p while knowingly and de-
liberately taking p to be false. If this is so, then the norm that guides us 
during doxastic deliberation is not as simple as the normativist suggests. 
While engaged in doxastic deliberation the question whether to believe that p 
is transparent, first and foremost, to the question whether it would be correct 
to believe that p in the sense of whether it would be rational to believe that p. 
Yet one need not take the question whether it would be rational to believe 
that p to be settled just by an answer to the question whether p. The question 
whether it would be rational to believe that p leaves room for a weighing of 
norms other than the truth-norm. The normativist may reply that norms other 
than the truth-norm can be relevant to the question whether to believe that p 
as long as such norms are compatible with the truth-norm [Shah and Velle-
man (2005), ft. 40]. Yet, if that is the case, the idea that in deploying the con-
cept of belief we commit ourselves to abiding by the truth-norm does not 
guarantee our experiencing its sole authority over relevant acts of belief for-
mation, which amounts to leaving (1) unexplained. Thus assuming that the 
truth-norm is constitutive of the concept of belief does not seem to be able to 
explain (1). So, even if (1-7) were true, (8) is false, hence the normativist has 
given us no reason to accept the truth of (C).  
Here is another way to identify the problem. In taking transparency to 
be a feature of all cases of doxastic deliberation that is allegedly explained by 
making the truth-norm constitutive of the concept of belief, and in correctly 
noting that we deploy such a concept in episodes of doxastic deliberation, the 
normativist is also committed to the truth of the following implicit premise: 
 
7’. In all cases of doxastic deliberation S abides only by the truth-norm. 
 
Yet, (7’) does not follow from (6-7). It is a much stronger thesis, which calls 
for independent justification. What the normative view of belief seems to re-
quire is the truth of some form of motivational internalism.9 Since cases of 
akrasia illustrate the possibility of S’s believing a proposition to be true while 
not being motivated by its truth, the more plausible form of motivational in-
ternalism for the normativist to rely on is one according to which if S takes p 
to be true, then S will be motivated to believe p insofar as S is rational. On 
this view, one can accept that all the evidence indicates that p, and at the 
same time fail to believe it. It is just that one would be, to that extent, irra-
tional. But relying on this form of motivational internalism seems to defeat 
the purpose of making the truth-norm part of the concept of belief. The pur-
pose of doing so is to guarantee that the transition from the question whether 
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to believe that p to the question whether p is immediate, i.e., that the transi-
tion should not depend on anything other than the very deployment of the 
concept of belief. Yet, once this type of motivational internalism gets in, the 
transition seems to depend on the concept of rational belief, not just the con-
cept of belief. 
Again, the normativist may reply that since the concept of belief is, on 
their view, a normative concept, judgment internalism will kick in as soon as 
the concept is applied, and so the subject will immediately be disposed to 
reason in a way that is guided by the truth-norm. But at this point, the norma-
tivist is still giving us reasons to accept that it is a conceptual truth about be-
lief that it is constitutively normative by attempting to show that the property 
of transparency can only be explained by assuming such a conceptual truth, 
so an appeal to the very normative view that has been assumed would just 
beg the question.  
 
 
VI. A TELEOLOGIST’S REPLY 
 
In this final section, I argue against premises (3), (4) and (5) in the 
normativist master argument. I show how a teleological view of belief can 
overcome all the problems the normativist master argument raises, in particu-
lar, the explanation of (1).  
Let us begin with premise (3). Remember that the normativist claim 
here is that, if belief were to be considered acceptance weakly regulated for 
truth, then (1) could not be explained, i.e., the teleologist could not explain 
why all cases of doxastic deliberation exhibit transparency. It is important to 
bear in mind that even the formation of beliefs through doxastic deliberation 
is open to the causal influence of non-alethic considerations. Transparency, 
as has been stressed throughout, is a property of doxastic deliberation as ex-
perienced from the first-personal point of view, i.e., a property of what we 
take ourselves to be doing when deliberating about whether to believe that p. 
Yet what explains the pervasive phenomenology of a cognitive process, such as 
deliberating about whether to believe that p, has more to do with the properties 
of the process itself than with the properties of the resulting outcome — the 
properties of belief. It thus seems odd to make it a requirement that just the 
properties of belief explain what we take ourselves to be doing when decid-
ing whether to believe that p, i.e., when trying to settle the question whether 
to believe that p through a process of doxastic deliberation. It makes much 
more sense to say that what explains the properties of what we take ourselves 
to be doing when we engage in the process of deliberating about whether to 
believe that p is what we do when we engage in such a process. And what we 
do when engaged in doxastic deliberation is to make a judgment — to judge 
upon reflection on the available evidence. To judge is to mentally do some-
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thing. Although the thesis that judging is a type of mental action is not com-
pletely uncontroversial [see e.g. O’Shaughnessy (1980); Strawson (2003)], its 
acceptance does not distort or affect the overall terms of the dialectic here. 
The normativist certainly takes the thesis to be completely uncontentious. A 
judgment, they claim ‘is a cognitive mental act of affirming a proposition … 
It is an act because it involves occurrently presenting a proposition, or putting 
it forward in the mind; and it is cognitive because it involves presenting the 
proposition as true –– or, as we have said, affirming it’ [Shah and Velleman 
(2005), p. 503]. 
Now, it is notoriously difficult to give a precise account of what makes 
a mental event or process a mental action. This topic certainly goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. Yet, there are such accounts on the philosophical 
market. Peacocke (2008) provides a plausible analysis of what is most dis-
tinctive about judging and other types of mental actions, such as deciding, 
calculating, accepting, reasoning or trying. ‘For a mental event to be a mental 
action, it must consist of an event which either is, or constitutively involves, a 
trying. If ‘constitutively involves’ is allowed to count as a reflexive relation, 
this criterion can be simplified. To be a mental action, a mental event must 
constitutively involve a trying’ [Peacocke (2008), p. 249]. Tryings them-
selves are, in turn, attempts to successfully do something. It is indeed a con-
stitutive feature of what we refer to as ‘trying to ĳ’ that one cannot try to ĳ 
while, at the same time, taking oneself to be bringing about a defective instance 
of ĳ-ing. With this account in hand, the following strategy is open to the 
teleologist. In doxastic deliberation, we settle the question whether to believe 
that p by making a judgment. Judging, as a type of mental action, constitu-
tively involves a trying and hence it constitutively involves aiming at suc-
cessfully doing something — even if one, as a matter of fact, may fail in 
doing so.10 In settling the question whether to believe that p, we thus cannot 
but take ourselves to be moved solely by considerations pertaining to the truth 
of p, for we take ourselves to be bringing about a successful instance of a 
judgment, and a successful instance of a judgment is a judgment that is true. 
So, were the teleologist to consider belief to be acceptance weakly regulated for 
truth, appeal to the properties of the practice of doxastic deliberation — as a 
practice that constitutively involves judging as a type of mental action — 
would allow him to account for transparency as a necessary property of such 
practice — premise (1) in the master argument. Hence premise (3) is false. 
What about premise (4)? According to premise (4) of the master argu-
ment, if belief were acceptance strongly regulated for truth, then the teleo-
logical account would entail that defective beliefs are not beliefs at all, since 
it would be constitutive of the state that we call ‘belief’ that it is always true. 
It is, however, difficult to see how strong truth-regulation would entail the 
exclusion of defective beliefs from the category of belief. We just need to ap-
preciate that a very natural way of understanding this (and other) teleological 
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account(s), is to characterize the aim or function of the item or state under 
discussion in historical terms, i.e., in terms of what is sometimes called its 
‘proper function’. Taking Millikan’s (1984, 1989) teleological approach as 
paradigmatic of this view, the idea is that some item A has a function F as its 
proper function only if either [Millikan (1989), p. 288]:  
 
(1) A originated as a ‘reproduction’ ... of some prior item or items that, due in 
part to possession of the properties reproduced, have actually performed F in 
the past, and A exists because (causally historically because) of this or these 
performances. (2) A originated as the product of some prior device that, given 
its circumstances, had performance of F as a proper function and that, under 
those circumstances, normally causes F to be performed by means of producing 
an item like A. 
 
It is thus a condition of adequacy for any teleological account that character-
izes a type of object, mechanism or state in terms of its proper function that 
the tokens of that type that fail to perform its proper function on occasion 
would still be considered as pertaining to the relevant type. On the teleologi-
cal view of belief, beliefs are characterized as states formed through mecha-
nisms that have been designed (by evolution, training, education and the like) 
to track only the truth. The proper function of such mechanisms is precisely 
to produce states that represent only the truth. Yet, this does not entail that 
such mechanisms always function as they were designed to. Automatically 
formed defective beliefs would thus still count as beliefs on the strong read-
ing of the truth-regulation endorsed by the teleologist, since their proper 
function remains to represent only the truth even if, qua defective beliefs, 
they fail to perform such a function. In the case of beliefs formed through 
doxastic deliberation, since they are the result of a subject’s acceptance of a 
proposition regulated by the subject’s intention to accept only the truth, the 
relevant properties to focus on are those constitutive of the notion of inten-
tion. Yet, there does not seem to be a problem here, since the fact that subjects 
intend to accept only what is true in doxastic deliberation does not entail that 
they are always successful at achieving what they intend to achieve. There is 
thus no reason to think that premise (4) in the master argument is true. 
Now, the normativist thinks that even if strong truth-regulation yielded 
a correct metaphysical characterization of belief, such a characterization 
would still fail to explain (1), i.e., it would still fail to explain the phenome-
nological immediacy of the transition from the deliberative question whether 
to believe that p to the factual question whether p, in which doxastic delibera-
tion consists. In the end it is premise (5) that carries the heaviest dialectical 
weight in the normativist master argument. Thinking of belief as acceptance 
strongly regulated for truth, the normativist argues, makes truth instrumental 
in such a transition. The following long quote [Shah (2003), p. 469] illus-
 
Is There an ‘Ougth’ in Belief?                                                                        87 
trates the normativist (erroneous, as I shall shortly argue) take on why the 
teleologist appears to be committed to this instrumental role of truth in doxa-
stic deliberation: 
 
I know that if my object is to form a belief about p, focusing on anything other 
than evidence of p’s truth (or falsity) will be ineffective. Expressing this to my-
self, I might think, “I’d like to form a belief about p. But my reasoning won’t 
count as belief-formation unless I focus solely on whether p is true; therefore in 
order to achieve my goal, I had better go about discerning whether p is true.” 
The focus on truth here is of instrumental value in the achievement of the goal 
of belief; therefore the focus on truth is mediated by an inference that it would 
be conducive to my goal to focus on truth. 
 
The normativist thus seems to assume that if belief is characterized as accep-
tance that is strongly regulated for truth, then forming a belief through doxa-
stic deliberation will involve two different mental states, a first-order state of 
discerning whether p is true and a second-order state of accepting p only if p 
is true — a second-order state at which S arrives upon explicitly reflecting on 
the truth of p. But why should the teleologist accept such a picture? Why 
should a transition between states that takes place at the metaphysical level 
also be felt as a transition when deploying the concept of belief in doxastic 
deliberation? After all, the teleologist does not just provide a metaphysical 
characterization of belief. The claim that belief is acceptance with the aim of 
accepting only what is true is also considered a conceptual truth about belief. 
Yet, no theory of concept possession requires that there be an explicit, i.e., 
conscious recognition of the metaphysical make-up of the concept deployed. 
So even if belief, characterized as S’s acceptance of p with the aim of accept-
ing p only if p is true, involved a second-order state, and the formation of 
such a second-order state were mediated by a causal process, S need not be 
aware of this underlying causal process in deploying the concept of belief. 
In general, the phenomenology that comes with deployment of a con-
cept need not be such that the subject is aware of the putative underlying 
causal processes constitutive of what the concept refers to. There is therefore 
no reason why the teleologist could not explain that what S takes herself to be 
doing when forming a belief through doxastic deliberation, and hence tokening 
a second-order state of accepting only what is true, is felt as non-inferential and 
immediate — in the sense of not seeming mediated to S — even though the ac-
tion of thus forming a belief constitutively involves a transition between 
states. The teleologist can explain that S’s awareness of the exclusive author-
ity of truth over her processes of belief formation through doxastic delibera-
tion is thus immediate, although it may not be unmediated, because the 
formation of the second-order state in which S’s belief consists would be me-
diated by causal processes of which S is unaware. There are hence ways of 
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construing a teleological view of belief that account for the transparency of 
the processes by which we consciously form beliefs without forsaking the 
normative nature of belief. 
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1 On some teleological views, e.g. McHugh’s (2011), the constitutive aim of be-
lief is knowledge, not truth. I will not discuss such views here. 
2 Other versions of normativism about belief can be found in e.g. Boghossian 
(2003), Engel (2007), Gibbard (2005) and Wedgwood (2002). The formulation of the 
truth-norm is slightly different to the one just mentioned in some of these versions. 
Such differences can be ignored for the purposes of this paper.  
3 See especially Steglich-Petersen (2006) and, more generally, against content 
normativity, Glüer & Wikforss (2009). 
4 Some philosophers, e.g., Frankish (2004) claim that the cognitive role of these 
two types of mental states is so importantly different that we should regard them as 
exemplars of different cognitive kinds, reflecting a genuine distinction in the mental 
domain. This stands in sharp contrast with the background view to this paper.  
5 See also e.g. Hieronymi (2005). 
6 In talking about states consumed by a subject, I am just trying to exploit a 
standard theme in teleological views of representations and their content. The key to 
the idea is that for something to be a representation at all, it must be a representation 
for the system — for the subject — itself. To illustrate: “[i]t is the devices that use rep-
resentations that determine these to be representations and, at the same time ... determine 
their content” [Millikan (1989), p. 282]. I take the transition from talk about representa-
tions and their contents to talk about beliefs to be unproblematic in this context. 
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7 I prefer to use ‘prescriptive’ rather than ‘normative’ here so as to leave it open 
that TEL could also be considered, as I intend to argue, a constitutively normative 
view of belief — it is just that the normativity is construed in teleological terms.  
8 Although the normativist formulates the standard of correctness for the con-
cept of belief in this biconditional form, i.e., a belief is correct if and only if it is true, 
the truth-norm itself is usually articulated in the simpler, conditional, form so as to 
avoid the obvious problem of prescribing to believe everything that is true (see Sec-
tion III above). 
9 Shah and Velleman (2005), ft 40, come close to addressing this issue, but they 
do not press the matter any further and simply suggest that their explanation presup-
pose only a ‘weak’ form of motivational internalism.  
10 The mental action of judging, like any other mental action, need not be 
caused by a previous trying, as it should be clear from the idea that tryings themselves 
are mental actions, so there is no risk here of vicious regress [cf. Peacocke (2008), pp. 
249-250]. 
11 Steglich-Petersen (2006), pp. 512-513, makes a similar point but focuses in-
stead on the constitutive properties of intention as opposed to the constitutive proper-
ties of the mental act of trying involved in judging. It is a necessary property of the 
very idea of intending to ĳ, he claims, that we experience what we do as the bringing 
about of a correct instance of ĳ-ing. Hence it is a necessary property of our intending 
to settle the question whether to believe that p that we experience what we do as the 
bringing about of a correct, true belief — even in those cases in which, as a matter of 
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